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Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Asking Improper Questions.-'rrial court's
that distriet attorney in
faith
who had testified to defendant's reputation and
whether witness had heard
of homosexual activities carried on by defendant is supported by
prosecutor's
that such
was based on information gained from oral reports and written arrest reports
of certain
that he had conferred with other members
in his office concerning legal point involved, and that consensus of opinion was that question was proper.
[2] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions- Failure to Instruct.-Court's failure to instruct jury on its own motion that
questions asked defendant's character witness concerning reports of defendant's homosexual activities are not proof of
facts therein contained and are not to be considered as evidence did not result in prejudice where no instruction to such
effect was requested, and where witness gave a negative
answer.
[3] Witnesses-Impeachment- Confessions.-While a confession
not shown to have been freely and voluntarily made cannot be
used for purpose of impeachment, when no objection has been
made in trial court as to involuntariness and no evidence is
presented to show involuntariness of confession, it is not error
to admit it for purpose of impeachment.
[4] Criminal Law-Instructions-Presumption of Innocence.-An
instruction that "If, when considering all the evidence, the
jury are satisfied to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then the presumption
of innocence no
prevails and you should find the defendant guilty" is not subject to objection of suggesting a
distinction between objective evidence and presumption of
innocence and depriving defendant of right to have all evidPnce, including presumption, considered until a vcrdiet waB
reached.
See CaLJur., Witnesses, § 132; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 773.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 611; [2] Criminal
Law,§ 1437(9);
Witnesses,§ 255; [4] Criminal Law,§ 796(4);
[5] Criminal Law, 1432; [6] Criminal Law,§ 1414; [7] Criminal
Law, § 325; [8] Witnesses, § 101; [9, 10] Criminal Law,
§ 1322(1); [11] Criminal Law, § 1324(1); [12] Criminal Law,
§ 1322 (2) [13-18] Jury, § 64.5; [19] Criminal Law, § 1384.
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Hannless Error
Instructions~ Evidence.·-·
"other" before word "rational" in instruction tbat circumstances alone
sufficient to convlet
where irreeoneilable with
rational conclusion" was not
error where People's ease rested
on direct
<'vidence and was
corroborated
some circumstantial
evidence.
Id.~Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where defendaut was
with assault with intent to commit rape in
llrst count
with rape and commission of infamous crime
nature in seeond and third counts and was
a
severance of flrst count, instructions that if jury found certain elements to he
they were to flnd defendant guilty
"as charg-ed" on second and third counts did not constitute
pn•judicial reference to unmentioned first count.
(7] !d.-Power and Conduct of Court.--Where improper questions
are asked, court acts within scope of its duty in refusing to
allow them to he answered, thoug-h no objection be made.
[8] Witnesses- Questions- Argumentative Questions.- Purely
argumentative questions asked witness are properly excluded.
[9) Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Testimony Inherently Improbable.-While appellate court will not
uphold a judgment or verdict based on evidence which is inherently improbable, it is not sufficient that circumstances
disclosed by testimony are merely unusual.
[10] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Testimony Inherently Improbable.-To warrant rejection of statements
given by witness who has been believed by trier of fact, there
must exist either physical impossibility that they are true or
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences
or deductions.
[11) !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Conflicting Evidence.-Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to
suspicion do not justify reversal of a judgment.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Testimony Inherently Improbable.-In prosecution for rape and for commission of infamous crime against nature, certain testimony
of complaining- witness, such as that her assailant helped her
pick up contents of her purse, that he kissed her, that she went
to work the next day, etc., was not so inherently improbable
that it could not have been accepted by jury.
[13] Jury-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.American tradition of trial by jury necessarily contemplates
an impartial jury drawn from cross-section of community, and
[13] Proof as to exclusion of or discrimination against eligible
class or race in respect to jury in criminal case, note, 1 A.L.R.2d
1291. See also Am.Jur., Jury, § 83 et seq.

Certain Persons and Classes.political or eeonomic group,
sox by officers
of selection
"'"'"Luu,'u"'"' of
is in contrayention
constitutional
trial and of due process and equal protection of
of Fourteenth Amendment of federal Constituat least as against an accused on trial or
beto class or race discriminated

[15] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.-~
Merely because names on jury list are compiled in part from
of directories such as ·who's Who, The Blue
Register or club lists does not in itself condemn
a whole or manner of its compilation, since clerk or
commissioner is free to go to any source for persons to
call.

[16] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons or Classes.\Vhen all jurors or a predominant part of them are selected
from private membership lists, basic concept of a jury panel
representative of community is lost.

[17] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.System of jury selection primarily from membership rosters
of certain private clubs and organizations would normally
tend to result in systematic inclusion of large proportion of
business and professional people, and any systematic attempt
to exclude wage earners cannot be permitted.

[18] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.-Generally, errors and irregularities in making up jury list will
not invalidate list when person objecting is not a member of
group discriminated against.

[19] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury-Selection.Though jury panel in question may have been selected in improper manner, its actual composition did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant by reason of exclusion of members of group to which defendant belonged where such panel
consisted of 525 persons and where, notwithstanding defendant's principal objection that of 73 individuals employed as
workers only five were hourly workers, it appeared that of
spouses of 178 panel members, 30 were hourly-rated workers,
85 were salaried workers, 15, were ranchers and 48 were businessmen, thus showing that working people or spouses of
such persons were represented on panel.
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Court of San
a new triaL

Prosecution for rape and for commission of infamous
nature.
of conviction affirmed.
William B. Esterman and William B. Murrish for
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CAR'l'EH, J.-,Joseph White was charged in count I of an
information with assault with intent to commit rape upon
Velma Gonzales on November 17, 1952. In counts II and liT
be wao; charged with rape and a violation of section 286* of
the Penal Code committed upon Agapita Gallegas, both
offenses alleged to have been committed on October 27, J 952.
He pleaded not guilty as to each count and moved to challenge the jury panel upon the ground that there had been
a systematic exclusion of Negroes, working people, men, and
young persons. The motion was denied. Upon defendant's motion for a severance, the court ordered separate trials of the
charges relating to each victim. Counts II and III were tried
first and the ,jury found defendant guilty on both counts. He
was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by
law as to each offense, the sentences to run concurrently.
Count I was then dismissed. Defendant has appealed from
an order denying his motion for a new trial and from the
judgment.
There was evidPnee presented at the trial to the effect that
shortly after Mrs. Gallegas had left her place of employment
in downtown San Bernardino, in the early evening of October 27, 1952, she was accosted and forced into an empty
lot where her assailant raped her and committed a violation
of Penal Code, section 286. On November 18, 1952, defendant
was arrested and taken to the police station where he was
identified by Mrs. Gallegas as her assailant. Mr. Parker, a
parole officer for the California Youth Authority, testified
that during an interview defendant made a statement admit-

*'' El'ery person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature,
eommittod with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than ten years.''
(Pen. Code, § 286.)
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commiSSIOn
the crimes
was also
the (•ffect that defendant had confessed to
in the presence of a shorthand
who testified concerning the contents of
the statement taken down
him. Defendant made no argument
the voluntary character of these confessions
hut
denied
made them.
commisconduct in the cross-examination of
mittcd
Maria Lawson, one of the character witnesses for the defense.
Aftrr the witness had testified on direct examination as to
l1efmdant 's good reputation in the community for chastity,
virtue and
she was asked on cross-examination:
''Had yon heard that repor·ts had been given to the San Bernardino Police Department that Joe ·white carried on homo,;exnal activities in Meadowbrook Park '' Defendant objectecl
and moved to strike the question on the ground that it had
been asked in bad faith and without factual basis. The
objection was overruled but the court reserved a ruling on
the motion to strike and the witness answered in the affirmative. From her answer it was evident that she did not understand the question and after the meaning of "homosexual"
was explained to her, she stated that she had not heard such
reports. A hearing was had (outside the presence of the
jury) on the issue of the prosecutor's good faith in asking
the question. At the hearing the prosecutor testified that
his question was based upon information concerning defendant's homosexual activities gained from oral reports and
written arrest reports received from Officer A very of the
San Bernardino Police Department, lVIr. Parker of the California Yonth Authority and Mr. Hartley of the district
attorney's office. He testified that he had researched the
law on the propriety of such a question and had conferred
with other members of his office about the legal point involved
and that the consensus of opinion was that the question was
a proper one. In view of this the trial court's finding that
the question was asked in good faith and its refusal to strike
the question are not without support. [2] In this connection it is also contended that the court erred in failing to
give, of its o-..vn motion, an instrnction to the effect that
qurstions concerning snch reports are not proof of the facts
therein contained a11d arP not to be considered as evidence.
Not only was such instructiOfl not asked for (People v.
Stevens, 5 Cal.2d 92, 100 [53 P.2d 133]) but a negative
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bcell obtainc•1l
or
t rne tl1at 11 confession uot shown to have been
and
vol
made cannot be used for the purpose of impeaehnwllt
v.
CaJ.App.2d 415, 419-420 [136
'.2(1 626 J) ; howen·r, wl1en no
has been made in

the trial court as to inYolun!ariness and no evidence is preto show the inYoltmtariness of the confession, it is
11ot error to admit it for the purpose of impeachment (People
,~
J2 Ca1.2d 200, 210
P.2d 505]).
It is w•xt eoniem1ed
defendant that the court erred
the
r-y (1) on the
of innocence;
(2) on t·ireumstantial evidence; and
) "in unexplained
n·fen'IH:l' to Couut:s [ r and HI." [ 4] \Vith
to the
(Jf imJO(:enee the eourt gave an instruction in
of section 1096'~ of' the Penal Code and then
''
·when
all the evidence,
the jnry are satisfied to a moral certainty and beyond a
reasonable doubt
the defendant is
then the
of imlllt('nee no
prevails and you should
find the defendant
" Defendant argues that these

~;enl(~d

'A def<·rHinut in a eriruinnl nction is presumed to be innocent until
n ncl in case of a reasonable doubt whether his
l:e is c:ntitletl to an
but the effect
the state
of proving
n
Heasona ble doubt is defined as
not a mere possi blc doubt been use everything relating
and
on
evidence,
open to some
Ol'
tlrnt state of the case, which, after
entire compnrison and eonsideration of all the
leaves the
minds of jurors in that contlition tlmt
cannot
feel an
to a moral certainty, of
truth
' ''

error.
circumstantial
the court infolloiYS: ''Yon are not permitted on
to find defcndaut guilty of
any cnme
Circumstances not
with the
that the
defendant is
but are irreconcilable with
any rational conclusion.''
added.) Defendant
argues that the omission of the word "other" before the
word ''rational'' rendered the instruction ambiguous and
-with the effect of
the defendant of
a
trial. It is difficult to see how such an
omission could have misled the
Moreover, the People's
ease restPd
on direct evic1ence and was merely corroborated
some eircumstautial evidence. [6] 'l'he references to eounts II and
of which defendant eomplains,
were mad•:
('OUrt in instructing the jury as to the
form of the verdicts. The court
instructed the jury
that if
fouml certain elements to be present they were
to find defendant gu
as "
in count JI of the
Inforlllatioa."
reference to count III was similar.
Defendant argues that this reference to counts II and III
eould not have failed to <Honse the
of the jury as
to the existence and natnre of another unmentioned count.
It is difficult to sf'e how any substantial prejudice conld hav•3
rrsulted hom a mere
refercnec of this nature. Indeed,
if any
was aroused the
eonld well have thought
that eount I had been (lismissed foe laek of evidcnee or that
the dt>fendant had al
berm acquitted of it.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in limiting one phase of the cross-examination of the prosecutrix.
'rhere is little merit in this contention. The incident complained of arose after the prosecuting witness had explained
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to

Where,
is propv. Harlan,
P. 9];
149 Cal. 435
; People v.
92 [232 P.
; Newsom v. Srniley, 57
[135 P.2d 24];
v.
70 CaL
App.2d 675
P.2d 833].)
Defendant further contends that the
of the complaining >Yitness \Yas inherently
in that she and
her assailant would have reacted
had she actually
been raped. It is argued that certain
such as
that ber assailant l1elped her pick up the contents of her
purse, that he kissed her, that she went to work the next
day, etc., is unbelievable when considered with other factors.
[9] It is true that an appellate court will not uphold a
judgment or verdict based upon evidence which is inherently
improbable; however, it is not sufficient that the circumstances
disclosed by the testimony are
unusual. (Kidroski
v. Andr~rson, 39 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [103 P.2d 1000].)
[10] As stated by this court in People v. Huston, 21 Cal.2d
690, 693 [134 P.2d
, '"l'o warrant the rejection of the
statrments
a witness who has been believed by a
trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility
that tl1ey are true, or their falsity must be apparent without
resorting to inferences or deductions. (Back v. Farnsworth,
25 Oal.App.2d 212, 219 [77 P.2d 295] ; Lufkin v. PattenBlinn Lumber
15 Cal.App.2d 259, 262 [59 P.2d 414];
Agoure v. Spinks Realty Co., 5 Oal.App.2d 444, 451 [42 P.2d
660] ; Hughes Y.
1 Oal.App.2d 349, 354, 355
[37 P.2d
; Powell v. Powell, 40 Cal.App. 155,
159
. ) [11] Conflicts and even
[ 180 P.
is subject to justifiable
do not
of a judgment, for it is the exclusive nNnmnnA
judge or
to determine the
is

limited classes of persons who did not represent a cross-section
of the
It appears that the panel, from which
the
for defrndant 's trial was selected, consisted of 525
people, all of ·whom came from a number of townships in
and around the
of San Bernardino. A sampling taken
of
of this panrl indicated that approximately 53.32
per cent were
14.8 per cent were businessmen
and ·women, 10 per cent were retired businessmen, 17.34
per cent were salaried \Yorkers, 1.27 per cent were hourly
workers, 4 per cent were retired workers and 3.57 per cent
were ranchers. Of the spouses of 178 of the members of the
panel, ;jQ wrre
\Yorkers, 85 were salaried workers,
15 were ranclwrs and 48 were businessmen. On an age basis
22.7 per eent of the panel were under 35 years
of age, 35.4 per cent were in the 36 to 45 age group, 16.8
per cent ·were in the 46 to 55 age group and the remainder
were over 55 years of age.
In explaining the method by which jury panels were
selected, th0 jury commissioner testified that each year questionnairt's were sent to persons whose names appeared on
the
lists of organizations snch as the Rotary,
Exchange Club. 20-30 Club, Chamber of
on the membership lists of women's clubs.
Questionnair('S were also
to persons who volunteered
and to those who were recommended by other citizens. Former
jurors were frequently placed on the panel if they so requested. The
commissioner also testified that an attempt
was made to
as many businessmen on the panel as possible, because such people had in the past been excused
frequently, and the attorneys of the county were anxious
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which
wage
was made to exclude persons
were of the
class.
that '' 'l'hc American traditiou

This does not mean, of course, that every
of all the economic,
political and geographical groups of the
such
would be impossible.
But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected
court officials without
and intentional exclusion
of any of these groups. Recognition must be
to the fact
that those eligible for
service arc to be found in every
stratum of
''
v. Southern Pae. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 220 [66 S.Ct.
90 L.Ed. 1181, 166 A.L.R 1412];
sec also 31 Am.,Jur. 1953 Supp., Jury, § 83.) \Vhere no
particular source is required by law, jury lists have been
in various ways and from numerous general sources
such as from
directories
v.
124 La. 378
[50 So. 406] ) , from the
of voters (People v. Hess,
104 Cal.App.2d 642
P.2d 65] ; People v. Dessaure, 68
.Y.S.2d 108
in 79 N.Y.S.2d 516]) and from
v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928 [22 So.2d
; United States v. Local 36 of International Fishermen,
70 F.Supp. 782.) The principal requirement is that there
should be no systematic and intentional exclusion of any
group or groups of citizens from the prospective jury lists.
(31 Am.Jur. 617-620, Jury,
83-88; 1 A.L.R.2d 1291-1398.)
[14] It has been stated that any '' . . . intentional,
aml deliberate exclusion of or discrimination against
members of a particular political or economic group, religious
officers in charge of the selection and
is in contravention of the constitutional
to jury trial and of the 'due process' and 'equal protection of the laws' clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal
at least as against an accused
on trial or litigant bdonging to the class or race discriminated
against." (31 .Am.Jur. 617.) [15] Just what does and

but

commiepersons to

a good cross( United
s~tpra; United
315 U.S.

States v.
supra; Glasset'
60
S.Ct. 437, 86 L.Ed.
.)
of the courts has been to
[16] 'I'he
lists from membership rosters
so
as such sources
lists such as city directories,
voting lists, or
directories (United States v. Local
36 of International Fishermen, supra; United States v. Dennis
supm) ; but when all jurors or a predominant part of them
arc selected from priYate
lists the basic concept
of a
of the community is lost.
As stated
United States, supra, 315 U.S.
60, 86, ''.
of the jury system,
our
requires that the jury be
a 'body truly
of the community,' and not the
organ of any
group or class. If that requirement
is
the officials
with choosing federal jurors
may exercise some discretion to the end that competent jurors
may be called. But they must not allow the desire for
competent
to lead them into selections which do not
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of
the community.
no matter how slight, toward the
selection of jurors by any method other than a process which
will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should
be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers
of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential
right. Steps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the
irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.
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ml'mbership roste:·s of' ce-rtain
would normally tPrH1 to res11lt
a
of business
a ddinitc 0xclnsion of ecri a in
peop 1e.
wage earners
cannot under our democratic
be
As stated
in Thiel v. Southern I'ac. Co., supra, 328 U.S. 217, 222-224,
a case which originated in the federal distril~t court in San
:B'raneisco, the '' . . . exclusion of all those who earn a daily
wage eannot be
federal or state law. Certainly
nothing in the federal statutes warrants such an exdusion.
And the California statutes are
devoid of justification
for the
California hnv a
wage earner
may be
as a
A
to be competent, need only be a citizen of the United States over
of the state and
for one
the age of
of his natural faculties
and not
and possessed
of the English language. California
(§ 198.)
(§ 199.) Nor is a
daily wage earner listed among those
from jury
service. ( § 200.) And nnder the state
'A juror shall
not be excused
a court for slight or trivial causes, or for
hardship, or for inconvenience to said
but
only when mate> rial
or destruction to said juror's
property or of
entrusted to said
is threatened
( § 201.)
proper jury
''Moreover, the
in this inselection clearly ontlaw
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violence to the
to sanction an exclusion
would encourage whatever desires those
the iielection of
may have to discriminate
persons of low eeonomic and social status. vYe would breathe
life into any latent tendencies to establish the
as the
instrument of the
and
That
we refuse to do.''
It is true that our United States
Court has upheld
the seleetion of so-called "blne ribbon" juries (Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261
S.Ct. 1613, 91 I_j.Ed. 2043]) but
such has no application here. In the case of Fay v. New York,
supra, the defendant did not object to the selection of the
general
panel of some 60,000 persons but only to the
selection of the "blue ribbon" panel of about 3,000 which
Under the New York
was sifted from the general
the
panel was selected from all
and from this a special "blue ribbon"
panel for the trial of difficult and complicated cases was
selected on the basis of qualifications. The selection of jurors
under this
favored those of superior qualifications
for the
panel but it did not discriminate against any
social,
or economic group nor against any religious
faith or race.
In the case at bar persons were not excluded from
the
list
because
were hourly wage earners
or mcmbc·rs of a minority group but the system which was
used would normally tend to exclude a large portion of such
persous. 'l'he .im.r commissionrr testified that an attempt
was made to
many business people on the panel as
possible. To
such a purpose the commissioner, in
compiling the
relied almost entirely on the meinbership rosters of
dubs and organizations such as th2
J_jions,
wonwn 's cln bs and the Chamber of Commerce.
Such a system would of necessity result in a jury list com-
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\Ymn:
2~8

P.~d

3'

aml those of less
']'hose

he so(• in l a]](1 eeonmn ii~ strata of the
thi:
of errtai n priyat<•
""\ system whieh tends to permit this
segmrnt of our eitizens
tlw seli•etion of ;inrirs
Sueh a

ts

dic;i·riwina1ory and shonld not be conclonecL
qnP~i
for 1his (:on rt 's determinathe ca,;:• at hat'. is whethr•r or not ihe trial eourt
•·ommittC'd re dieial errm' in refnsing to dismiss the entire
\\'en
of thr opinion that under tbe faets hrre
(l icl not. [18] It is generally recognized that
rnle. (•rrors and rregnlarities in making up a
not iJtYali(late the list wl1en the person obje(:ting
1S not a llll'~JI!wr of the group discriminated against. (People
14 Cal.2d 17, 19 [92 P.2d 387].) As stated
. H css. 104 Cal. A pp.2d 642 [234 P.2d 6:5 I, "A
dr· fc•JH1 ant
if he is tried by an impartial jury
more."
[19] BH·n
panel in question may have
been selede<1 in an improper mamwr it eanuot be said that
nd:wl
resnlted in any substantial prejndie•'
!o the def:·wlant b.1· rea'ioll of thr exclusion of members of
lhe ~rronp to whi(•h def('JHlant belong(•d. The panel to which
'lie 'j,. f':·nd<J nt
'·on,;ist Pd of :J:?fi persons. A sampling
tnlu·n of part of his p11nel indieated that 209 were house14 \\ere ranelwrs, 97 w•·re aetin• or retirrd bnsinesslll•'ll nnd \\.OllH'll and D1 \l'>"re :wtin~ or retired working people.
Defl'ndanl 's prin(·i
serms to be that of the 73
as \Yorkers
fi \Yrre hourly workers;
h(rwr'H'l'. <JS
pointed ont. of the spouses of 178
ill\' pn11t>l nwtlJhei·s. :lO \H'n' l10nrl;:-rated workrrs, 85 were
~a lari''• l
1:J
ranchers and 48 \Yere businessmen.
!1 •.nnild 1h11s 11ppcar that >mrking people or the spouses
or suvh perC'ons \H'rc represented on the panel. "Morenwr, it is 110 (1<'llial of any eonstitutional right, eyen if there
Wt'rr 110 persons on the jury panel belonging to the 'groups
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or classes of persons to which the defendants belong.' Their
right is to an 'impartial'
It is the
to
and not to select them.
68, 7 S.Ct.
30 L.Ed. 578;
U.S.
8 S.Ct.
31 hEd. 80; Brown v. New Jersey,
1899, 175 U.S. 1
20 S.Ct. 77, 44 L.Ed. 119 Howard v.
200 .S.
26 S.Ct.
50 L.Ed. 421.
To hold with the defendants in this connection would be to
hold that as a matter of law an
bias existed in the
minds of persons of all other gToups than a defendant
less of an actual state of mind.
"
(United States v.
Local 36 of International
supra, 70 F.Supp.
782, 797.)
The American system requires an
jury drawn
from a cross-section of the entire community and recognition must be given to the fact that eligible jurors are
to be found in every stratum of society. In selecting a
truly representative jury panel, the membership lists of
various clubs and organizations may properly be used, but
they should not be relied on as the principal source of prospective jurors nor should they be used to the complete exclusion of other general sources more likely to represent a
cross-section of the population, such as telephone directories,
voting lists, and city directories. Any system or method of
jury selection which fails to adhere to these democratic fundamentals, which is not designed to encompass a cross-section
of the community or which seeks to favor limited social or
economic classes, is not in keeping with the American tradition and will not be condoned by this court.
In view of our previous discussion of the matter, defendant's application to produce additional evidence, concerning
the lack of good faith of the district attorney in his crossexamination of character witness Maria Lawson, could serve
no useful purpose and is hereby denied.
From our examination of the record in this case, we find
no error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant or which
would justify a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a
new trial are, therefore, affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, .J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J. and Spence, .J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
26, 1955.

